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 THE RIGHT TO EXPLANATION, EXPLAINED 
 
Margot E. Kaminski† 
ABSTRACT  
Many have called for algorithmic accountability: laws governing decision-making by 
complex algorithms, or artificial intelligence (AI). The EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) now establishes exactly this. The recent debate over the “right to 
explanation” (a right to information about individual decisions made by algorithms) has 
obscured the significant algorithmic accountability regime established by the GDPR. The 
GDPR’s provisions on algorithmic accountability, which include a right to explanation, have 
the potential to be broader, stronger, and deeper than the requirements of the preceding Data 
Protection Directive. This Article clarifies, including for a U.S. audience, what the GDPR 
requires. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and civil society groups on both sides of the Atlantic have been 
calling for algorithmic accountability: laws governing decision-making by 
complex algorithms, or AI.1 Algorithms can be used to make, or to greatly 
 
 1. See, e.g., Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the 
Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC. 973 
(2016) (analyzing the benefits and limitations of transparency in establishing algorithmic 
accountability); Lee A. Bygrave, Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive 
and Automated Profiling, 17 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REP. 17 (2001) (analyzing Art. 15 of the 
1995 EC Directive on data protection); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 (2008) (examining algorithmic decision-making and calling for 
transparency, accountability, and accuracy); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored 
Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (calling for accountability 
for automated predictions); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014) (charting the privacy 
harms caused by big data and proposing procedural due process); Deven R. Desai & Joshua 
A. Kroll, Trust But Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2017) 
(providing a computer scientist’s perspective on algorithmic accountability and calling for 
specific tailored solutions); Mireille Hildebrandt, The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the 
Profiling Era, DIGITAL ENLIGHTENMENT Y.B. 41 (2012) (highlighting the potential of the 
GDPR to protect individuals in the profiling era); Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for 
Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017) (proposing a toolkit to ensure 
algorithmic accountability); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
633 (2017) (calling for collaboration on algorithmic accountability across computer science, 
law, and policy); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421 
(2017) (proposing that black-box medical algorithms should be governed through 
collaborative governance); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 393 (2014) (calling for ethical standards to be applied to mass data collection 
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affect, decisions about credit, employment, education, and more.2 Algorithmic 
decision-making can be opaque, complex, and subject to error, bias, 
discrimination, in addition to implicating dignitary concerns.3 The literature in 
 
and use); Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American 
Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321 (1992) (developing an approach to govern 
the use of computers and personal data); Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and 
Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 23 (2005) (addressing the use of data matching and mining to 
identify persons against whom an official action is taken); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 
69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83 (2017) (calling for a federal agency to govern algorithms); Tal Z. Zarsky, 
Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503 (2013) (creating a framework for 
understanding transparency as a regulatory concept in algorithmic accountability); Michal S. 
Gal, Algorithms as Illegal Agreements, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67 (2019) (examining potential 
legal solutions to concerns raised by algorithmic-facilitated coordination); Bryan Casey, 
Ashkon Farhangi & Roland Vogl, Rethinking Explanable Machines: the GDPR’s “Right to 
Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 145 
(2019) (discussing machine explainability in the context of the European GDPR’s “right to 
explanation”). 
 2. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 4. 
 3. See generally Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
Sept. 2019) (identifying three categories of concerns behind calls for regulating algorithmic 
decision-making: dignitary, justificatory, and instrumental); see also Andrew D. Selbst & Solon 
Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1118–26 (2018) 
(discussing the rationales behind calls for explanations of algorithmic decision-making) 
[hereinafter Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal]. On error, see Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, 
at 8 (“Scoring systems and the arbitrary and inaccurate outcomes they produce must be subject 
to expert review.”); Crawford & Schultz, supra note 1, at 104 (“This aggregation of various 
agencies’ data allows law enforcement to predict or flag individuals as suspicious or worthy of 
investigation, search, or detention based on the agency’s outlined criteria . . . . [T]his method 
may sometimes lead to erroneous results.”); Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1506 (noting that “the 
growing use of predictive practices . . . could be tainted with errors and overinvasive”). On 
bias and discrimination, see Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 674 (2016) (“Approached without care, data mining can reproduce existing 
patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision makers, or simply reflect the 
widespread biases that persist in society.”); Citron, supra note 1, at 1262 (noting that “[t]he 
biases of individual programmers can have a larger, accumulating effect”); Citron & Pasquale, 
supra note 1, at 13 (“Far from eliminating existing discriminatory practices, credit-scoring 
algorithms instead grant them an imprimatur, systematizing them in hidden ways.”). On 
dignity, see Bygrave, supra note 1, at 18; Isak Mendoza & Lee A. Bygrave, The Right Not to Be 
Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, in EU INTERNET LAW: REGULATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT 77, 84 (Tatiani Synodinou et al. eds., Springer, 2017) (noting “a concern to 
uphold human dignity by ensuring that humans (and not their ‘data shadows’) maintain the 
primary role in ‘constituting’ themselves”); Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1548; see also Meg Leta 
Jones, The Right to A Human in the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer Automation and 
Personhood, 42 SOC. STUD. SCI. 216 (2017) (exploring the role of dignity in data protection law 
addressing automated decision-making). 
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the United States has been largely speculative, operating in a policy vacuum.4 
This is resolutely not, however, the case in the European Union. 
On May 25, 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) went 
into effect in the EU.5 The GDPR contains a significant set of rules on 
algorithmic accountability, imposing transparency, process, and oversight on 
the use of computer algorithms to make significant decisions about human 
beings.6 The GDPR may prove to be an example, both good and bad, of a 
robust algorithmic accountability regime in practice. 7  However, to a U.S. 
audience, the recent vigorous debate around whether there is a “right to 
explanation” in the GDPR may inspire confusion. 8  Arguments over the 
 
 4. Senator Wyden has, for example, proposed algorithmic accountability as part of his 
proposed federal privacy legislation. More recently, Senator Wyden and Senator Booker along 
with Representative Clarke proposed the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019. Federal law 
governing the private sector’s use of algorithmic decision-making does not, however, currently 
exist. See S. 2188, 115th Cong. (2018), at 2, 6, 32; see also S. _ 116th Cong. (2019) (Algorithmic 
Accountability Act of 2019). 
 5. GDPR FAQs, EU GDPR.ORG, https://eugdpr.org/the-regulation/gdpr-faqs/ 
[https://perma.cc/FV79-VBRU] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
 6. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 
2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and 
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data 
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 at arts. 22, 13, 14, 15 [hereinafter GDPR].  
 7. Compare, e.g., Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 995, 1014–15 (2017), with Hildebrandt, supra note 1. 
 8. See Maja Brkan, Do Algorithms Rule the World? Algorithmic Decision-Making in the 
Framework of the GDPR and Beyond, INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 13–20 (2019); Casey et al., supra 
note 1; Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ Is 
Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17, 44 (2017) [hereinafter 
Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm]  
In 2016, to the surprise of some EU data protection lawyers, and to 
considerable global attention, Goodman and Flaxman asserted in a short 
paper that the GDPR contained a “right to an explanation” of algorithmic 
decision making. As Wachter et al. have comprehensively pointed out, the 
truth is not quite that simple.  
Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a “Right to an Explanation” to a 
“Right to Better Decisions”?, 16 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 46 (2018); Bryce Goodman & Seth 
Flaxman, European Union Regulations on Algorithmic Decision-Making and “a Right to Explanation”, 
38 AI MAG. 50, 55–56 (2017); Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to 
Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 243, 246 (2017); Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 16; Antoni Roig, Safeguards 
for the Right Not to Be Subject to a Decision Based Solely on Automated Processing (Article 22 GDPR), 8 
EURO. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2017); Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 3, at 1106; Andrew 
D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, 7 INT’L DATA 
PRIVACY L. 233, 235 (2017); Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Luciano Floridi, Why a Right 
to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 
7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76 (2017) [hereinafter Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of 
Automated Decision-Making Does not Exist]; Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt & Chris Russell, 
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purported right to explanation obscure the true substance and depth of the 
GDPR’s algorithmic accountability regime. 
This Article clarifies, including for a U.S. audience, what is and is not 
required by the GDPR. It contributes to the existing conversation over 
algorithmic accountability in the GDPR by addressing the authoritative 
guidelines on automated decision-making. 9  Contrary to several scholars, I 
understand the GDPR to create a broader, stronger, and deeper algorithmic 
accountability regime than what existed under the EU’s Data Protection 
Directive (DPD).10  The debate over the right to explanation threatens to 
obscure this significant development. 
Part II of this Article begins by explaining for a U.S. audience the status of 
the various interpretative documents that accompany the GDPR. Part III 
identifies the provisions of the GDPR that apply to algorithmic accountability, 
and points to textual ambiguities that gave rise to disagreements over the right 
to explanation. Part IV uses the interpretative documents introduced in Part 
II, including recent authoritative guidelines, to show how many of the 
questions left open in the GDPR’s text have been subsequently narrowed or 
resolved. Part V turns to the right to explanation and other transparency 
mechanisms. Throughout, this Article focuses on the GDPR’s requirements 
for private companies rather than for governments.  
II. GDPR BASICS 
First, a U.S. audience needs to understand the legal materials at play. The 
GDPR consists of both text (Articles) and an extensive explanatory preamble. 
The preambular provisions, known as Recitals, do not have the direct force of 
law in the EU.11 A Recital is supposed to “cast light on the interpretation to be 
 
Counterfactual Explanations without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 841 (2018) [hereinafter Wachter et al., Counterfactual]. 
 9. ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED 
INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING AND PROFILING FOR THE PURPOSES OF REGULATION 
2016/679, 17/EN. WP 251rev.01 (Feb. 6, 2018) [hereinafter GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED 
INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING]. Three pieces address the earlier draft version of these 
guidelines. Casey et. al, supra note 1, at 171; see generally Michael Veale & Lilian Edwards, Clarity, 
surprises, and further questions in the Article 29 Working Party draft guidance on automated decision-making 
and profiling, 2 COMPUT. L. & SECURITY REV. 398 (NEEDS PARA); Wachter et. al, Counterfactual, 
supra note 8.  
 10. See Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 20–21; Wachter et al., Why 
a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, supra note 8, at 78; Wachter 
et. al, Counterfactual, supra note 8, at 861–71. 
 11. Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does not Exist, 
supra note 8, at 80. 
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given to a legal rule [but] it cannot in itself constitute such a rule.”12 This gives 
Recitals a liminal legal status—they are not binding law, but they are often cited 
as authoritative interpretations where the GDPR is vague.13  
While Recitals can clarify how the GDPR’s standards should be applied, 
they often contain language that goes well beyond what is in the GDPR itself, 
reflecting the result of political compromise during negotiations.14 Recitals 
cannot create new legal requirements, but the line between valid interpretation 
and invalid creation of new law can be hard to draw. 
Discussions of the GDPR also frequently cite interpretative guidelines 
issued by a group previously known as the Article 29 Working Party and now 
called the European Data Protection Board. 15  The Working Party/Data 
Protection Board is made up of Data Protection Authorities (the regulators 
tasked with enforcing the GDPR) from around the EU who come to a 
consensus over the interpretation of data protection provisions. As Data 
Protection Authorities in EU Member States enforce the GDPR on the 
ground, they refer to the guidelines issued by the Working Party/Data 
Protection Board. 
Article 29 Working Party guidelines, again, do not have the direct force of 
law. They are, nonetheless, strongly indicative of how enforcers will interpret 
the law. Now that the GDPR is in effect, these guidelines have additional, 
though indirect, teeth. The European Data Protection Board under the GDPR 
has additional supervisory and harmonizing capabilities over Member State 
Data Protection Authorities.16 A local Data Protection Authority, in other 
words, is now even more likely to adhere to the guidelines than under the 
Directive. 
U.S. audiences thus need to understand that while only the text of the 
GDPR is technically binding law, both Recitals and Working Party/Data 
Protection Board guidelines play a significant role, in practice, in guiding how 
 
 12. Case 215/88 Casa Fleischhandels [1989] European Court of Justice ECR 2789 [31], 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61988CJ0215 
[https://perma.cc/C8RK-45FP]. 
 13. See, e.g., Brkan, supra note 8, at 16 (“Dismissing the possibility of the existence of the 
right to explanation altogether because recitals are not legally binding is too formalistic.”). 
 14. Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 50 (“In the GDPR however, 
as a matter of political expediency, many issues too controversial for agreement in the main 
text have been kicked into the long grass of the recitals, throwing up problems of just how 
binding they are.”). 
 15. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 68. 
 16. Id. at art. 70; see Amber Hawk, The Recitals Are Essential to Your Understanding the General 
Data Protection Regulation, HAWK TALK (Jan. 28, 2016), http://amberhawk.typepad.com/
amberhawk/2016/01/the-recitals-are-essential-to-your-understanding-the-general-data-
protection-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/7S5B-AH8E]. 
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companies will behave. A company, concerned about the GDPR’s significant 
penalties (famously up to 4% of worldwide revenue) backed by an increasingly 
rights-protective European Court of Justice, is likely to follow both the Recitals 
and Working Party guidance because they are indicative of what the GDPR’s 
enforcers are likely to do.17 Although these texts are not technically binding, 
they strongly indicate how enforcers and eventually courts will likely interpret 
the text. 
In another Article, I argue at length that this is precisely how the GDPR is 
intended to work.18 The GDPR is, in large part, a collaborative governance 
regime.19 The text is full of broad standards, to be given specific substance over 
time through ongoing dialogues between regulators and companies, backed 
eventually by courts. Both the Recitals and the Working Party guidelines, along 
with numerous mechanisms ranging from a formal process for establishing 
codes of conduct to less formal impact assessment requirements, are part of 
this collaborative approach.20 
Thus, when scholars argue that what is in the Recitals is not the law,21 they 
are not only insisting on a technicality—distinguishing between harder and 
softer legal instruments—they are also disregarding the fundamentally 
collaborative, evolving nature of the GDPR, and removing important sources 
of clarity for companies as the law develops. 
 
 17. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 84. For indicators of the Court’s increasing interest in 
data protection, see, for example, Joint Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland 
Ltd. v. Minister for Commc’ns, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238 (2014) (finding data retention 
requirements to violate the fundamental right to data protection); Case C-131/12, Google 
Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) (2014) (finding that Google as 
a search engine is a data controller and thus is responsible for affording individuals the data 
protection right to erasure (“right to be forgotten”) from search engine indexing). While the 
ECtHR is not responsible for GDPR interpretation, it also forms a backstop to surveillance-
related law in the EU. See Roman Zakharov v. Russia, 2015-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 205 (finding 
Russian metadata surveillance in violation of fundamental rights).  
 18. See Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 3. 
 19. For discussions of collaborative governance (also known as “new governance”), see, 
e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). 
 20. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 3, at 21–22. 
 21. See Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not 
Exist, supra note 8, at 80. 
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III. ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE TEXT OF 
THE GDPR 
This Part introduces the text of the GDPR that applies to algorithmic 
decision-making. There are four Articles of the GDPR that specifically address 
algorithmic decision-making. Article 22 of the GDPR addresses “[a]utomated 
individual decision-making, including profiling.”22 Articles 13, 14, and 15 each 
contain transparency rights around automated decision-making and profiling.23 
More general GDPR provisions, such as the right to object, the right to 
rectification (correction), data protection by design and by default, and the 
requirement of data protection impact assessments, likely apply to most or 
even all algorithmic decision-making.24 For the sake of brevity and clarity, this 
Part discusses only the text of Articles 22, 13, 14, and 15, which specifically 
reference automated decision-making.25 As others have pointed out, however, 
the more generally applicable provisions of the GDPR also play an important 
role in governing algorithmic decision-making.26 
A. ARTICLE 22: AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING 
Article 22 states that individuals “have the right not to be subject to a 
decision based solely on automated processing.”27 Scholars have pointed out, 
based on the historical treatment of similar text in the Data Protection 
Directive (DPD), the predecessor to the GDPR, that this could be interpreted 
as either a right to object to such decisions or a general prohibition on 
significant algorithmic decision-making. 28  Interpreting Article 22 as 
establishing a right to object would make the right narrower. In practice, it 
would allow companies to regularly use algorithms in significant decision-
making, adjusting their behavior only if individuals invoke their rights. 
 
 22. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22. 
 23. See id. at arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h). 
 24. See Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 19 (noting “other parts of 
the GDPR related (i) to the right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) and the right to data 
portability; and (ii) to privacy by design, Data Protection Impact Assessments and certification 
and privacy seals”), 23, 77; Casey et. al, supra note 8, at 173–76 (discussing DPIA safeguards); 
GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 29 (discussing 
DPIA and data protection officer), 34 (discussing right to object); see also GDPR, supra note 6, 
Recital 91 (described as “[n]ecessity of a data protection impact assessment”). 
 25. See generally GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 13, 14, 15, 22. 
 26. See Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 19. 
 27. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22(1). 
 28. See, e.g., Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 9 (“[t]his distinction . . . suggests that 
Art. 22(1) is intended as a prohibition and not a right that the data subject has to exploit” but 
noting that it can be argued both ways); Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated 
Decision-Making Does not Exist, supra note 8, at 94. 
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Interpreting Article 22 instead as a prohibition on algorithmic decision-making 
would require all companies using algorithmic decision-making to assess which 
exception they fall under and to implement safeguards to protect individual 
rights, or to not deploy algorithmic decision-making at all. 
The Article 22 right/prohibition applies only when the decision is “based 
solely” on algorithmic decision-making, and it applies only when the decision 
produces “legal effects” or “similarly significant” effects on the individual.29 
What either of these restrictions means is unclear from the GDPR’s text alone. 
One could narrowly interpret “based solely” to mean that any human 
involvement, even rubber-stamping, takes an algorithmic decision out of 
Article 22’s scope; or one could take a broader reading to cover all 
algorithmically-based decisions that occur without meaningful human 
involvement. 30  Similarly, one could take a narrow reading of “similarly 
significant” effects to leave out, for example, behavioral advertising and price 
discrimination, or one could take a broader reading and include behavioral 
inferences and their use.31 
There are three exceptions to the Article 22 right/prohibition. The first is 
when the automated decision is “necessary for . . . a contract.”32 The second is 
when a Member State of the European Union has passed a law creating an 
exception. 33  The third is when an individual has explicitly consented to 
algorithmic decision-making.34 Both the contractual exception and the explicit 
consent exception could be interpreted to be broader or narrower in nature, 
 
 29. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22(1) (“The data subject shall have the right not to be 
subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, which 
produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.”).  
 30. See, e.g., Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 11 (“Even if a decision is formally 
ascribed to a person, it is to be regarded as based solely on automated processing if a person 
does not actively assess the result of the processing prior to its formalization as a decision.”); 
Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does not Exist, supra note 
8, at 88 (“[T]his creates a loophole whereby even nominal involvement of a human in the 
decision-making process allows for an otherwise automated mechanism to avoid invoking 
elements of the right of access . . . addressing automated decisions.”). 
 31. See, e.g., Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 47–48 (discussing 
whether advertising constitutes a significant effect), 69 (discussing the GDPR’s inconsistent 
treatment of inferences); Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 8, at 265 (“[S]ignificant effects 
should also include cases of neuromarketing manipulation or price discrimination . . . .”). 
 32. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22(2)(a) (“[N]ecessary for entering into, or performance 
of, a contract between the data subject and a data controller.”). 
 33. Id. at art. 22(2)(b) (“[A]uthorised by Union or Member State law to which the 
controller is subject.”). 
 34. Id. at art. 22(2)(c) (“[B]ased on the data subject’s explicit consent.”). 
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depending for example on how one interprets “necessary for . . . a contract.”35 
In the case of sensitive, or “special category,” data, even fewer exceptions 
apply.36  
Even when an exception to Article 22 applies, a company must implement 
“suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests . . . .”37 This requirement is the source of the debate over 
the right to explanation. Suitable safeguards, according to the text, must 
include “at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the 
controller, to express his or her point of view and to contest the decision.”38 
This explicitly creates a version of algorithmic due process: a right to an 
opportunity to be heard.39 These are the only safeguards named in the GDPR’s 
text. The use of the words “at least,” however, indicates that these are an open 
list of minimum requirements, and a company should do more. As discussed 
in Part IV, both the preamble (Recital) and interpretative guidance have added 
to this list of both suggested and required safeguards, and both include as a 
safeguard a right to explanation of an individual decision. 
One important note on suitable safeguards: the specific minimum 
examples above apply with respect to the contractual exception and explicit 
consent exception, but are not in the text of the Member State law exception.40 
This textual difference leaves room for the possibility that Member States 
might enact a different set of suitable safeguards.41 It remains to be seen 
whether Data Protection Authorities and courts will allow Member States to 
adopt significantly different protections against algorithmic decision-making. 
 
 35. Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 14–15; Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation 
of Automated Decision-Making Does not Exist, supra note 8, at 98. 
 36. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22(4) (“Decisions referred to in paragraph 2 shall not be 
based on special categories of personal data referred to in Article 9(1), unless point (a) or (g) 
of Article 9(2) applies . . . .”). 
 37. GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 22(2)(b), 22(3). 
 38. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22(3). 
 39. Several U.S. scholars have called for algorithmic due process, mimicking procedural 
due process rights. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1; see generally Crawford & Schultz, supra 
note 1. 
 40. GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 22(2)(b), 22(3). 
 41. Wachter et al. argue that this means that the same safeguards do not apply. Wachter 
et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does not Exist, supra note 8, at 93; 
Brkan, supra note 8, at 12 (describing German law); see Gianclaudio Malgieri, Automated 
Decision-Making in the EU Member States; The Right to Explanation and other ‘Suitable 
Safeguards’ (Aug. 17, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3233611 [https://perma.cc/WLC6-
X8QC]. 
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B. ARTICLES 13, 14, AND 15: NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS RIGHTS 
Outside of Article 22, the GDPR contains a series of individual 
notification and access rights specific to automated decision-making. Article 
13 establishes a series of notification rights/requirements when information is 
collected directly from individuals.42  Article 14 establishes a similar set of 
notification rights/requirements when information about individuals is 
collected from third parties.43 Article 15 creates an individual right of access to 
information held by a company that can be invoked “at reasonable intervals.”44 
All three Articles contain an identical provision requiring disclosure of “the 
existence of automated decision-making, including profiling.”45  Additionally, 
this provision requires disclosure of “meaningful information about the logic involved, 
as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing 
for the data subject.”46 
This language has provoked debate, especially over the question of 
timing.47 The language in all three Articles is identical, but the temporal context 
is different. Articles 13 and 14, roughly speaking, require companies to notify 
individuals when data is obtained,48 while Article 15 creates access rights at 
almost any time. Some scholars have argued that because the text of the three 
Articles is identical, it must refer to the same information, which indicates that 
“meaningful information about the logic involved” can be only a broad 
 
 42. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 13. 
 43. Id. at art. 14. 
 44. Id. at art. 15. See GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 63 (described as “[r]ight of access”). 
 45. GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h) (collectively, “meaningful 
information” provisions) (emphasis added). 
 46. GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h). 
 47. See, e.g., Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 16 (“[T]he wording of Art. 15 does not 
necessarily exclude the possibility that it embraces a right of ex post explanation of an Art. 22 
type decision.”); Selbst & Powles, supra note 8, at 236; Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation 
of Automated Decision-Making Does not Exist, supra note 8, at 90 (“As the scope of information 
data controllers are required to disclose in Article 15 is the same as in Article 13, Article 15 
similarly requires only limited information about the functionality of the automated decision-
making system.”). 
 48. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 13 (requiring it when data is obtained); id. at art. 14(3)(a) 
(requiring disclosure “within a reasonable period after obtaining the personal data, but at the 
latest within one month, having regard to the specific circumstances in which the personal 
data are processed”). Article 14 also envisions notification in communication with a data 
subject where data is used for communication (art. 14(3)(b)) or upon disclosure of data to 
another third party (art. 14(3)(c)). These both refer to a later notification than upon obtaining 
data, but it is harder to envision when this might refer to algorithmic decision-making that has 
already occurred (unless one is communicating the results to an individual or third party, 
perhaps?). 
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overview of a decision-making system.49 Others argue, however, that, read in 
context, “meaningful information” must mean multiple things.50 Articles 13 
and 14 might require an overview of a system prior to processing, but Article 
15’s access right could provide deeper disclosure, including insight into a 
particular decision affecting a particular individual. The text of the GDPR does 
not clarify this conflict one way or another. 
There are exceptions to the GDPR’s notification and access 
requirements.51 While not included in the text of the GDPR, an accompanying 
Recital mentions an exception for intellectual property rights—that is, trade 
secrets and copyright law.52 Some scholars argue that, in practice, trade secrets, 
in particular, represent a significant obstacle to meaningful disclosure of 
algorithms.53 This has certainly been the case in the United States.54 Others 
observe, however, that fundamental rights such as the right to data protection 
take precedence over trade secrecy.55 
The text of the GDPR thus creates both transparency and process rights 
around algorithmic decision-making. The text itself, however, leaves 
considerable room for interpretation. But both accompanying and subsequent 
interpretative documents narrow and clarify the GDPR’s text, resolving a 
number of the conflicts discussed above. 
 
 49. Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, 
supra note 8, at 82. 
 50. See, e.g., Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 8, at 244; Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, 
at 16; Selbst & Powles, supra note 8, at 236. 
 51. See GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 14(5), 15(4). 
 52. See GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 63 (“That right should not adversely affect the rights 
or freedoms of others, including trade secrets or intellectual property and in particular the 
copyright protecting the software.”). The copyright argument makes little sense. See Brkan, 
supra note 8, at 22. 
 53. Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, 
supra note 8, at 85. 
 54. See, e.g., Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 111 (2017) 
(“Transparency Measures”); David S. Levine, The Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency, in 
THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
406 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2010); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, 
and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1349–
50 (2018). 
 55. Brkan, supra note 8, at 21–24; Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 8, at 262; Selbst & 
Powles, supra note 8, at 242. 
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IV. ALGORITHMIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GDPR, 
INTERPRETED 
Both the Recitals and recently adopted Working Party guidelines clarify the 
GDPR’s text in important ways. Article 22 and the “meaningful information” 
provisions are not devoid of substance; they create an algorithmic 
accountability regime that is broader, stronger, and deeper than what existed 
in Europe prior to the GDPR.56 This Part first explains how the GDPR’s text 
has been clarified, with reference to the debates discussed in Part III above.57 
It then explains why the GDPR’s version of algorithmic accountability is 
broader, stronger, and deeper than Article 15 of the DPD. 
First, the Working Party guidelines clarify that Article 22 is a prohibition 
on algorithmic decision-making, not a mere right to object to it.58 This is 
significant because it clarifies that companies have a duty not to use solely 
automated decision-making, rather than a mere duty to respond to individuals 
who object to it. Companies using algorithmic decision-making will, therefore, 
have to assess which exception they fall under (contract, explicit consent, or 
Member State law), which will often trigger additional disclosures to 
individuals as companies attempt to obtain explicit consent or to justify why 
such decision-making is necessary to a contract.59 
Second, the guidelines explain that for an automated decision to fall 
outside of Article 22, human involvement must be meaningful.60 A company 
does not escape Article 22 solely by having a human rubber-stamp algorithmic 
decisions.61 Human oversight must be “carried out by someone who has the 
authority and competence to change the decision.” 62  That person must 
additionally have access to information beyond just the algorithm’s outputs.63 
The GDPR will thus have the effect of requiring companies to think about 
 
 56. See GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g), 15(1)(h).  
 57. For another (more pessimistic) take on the guidelines, see Veale & Edwards, supra 
note 9. 
 58. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 19. 
 59. Id. at 13 (“Controllers seeking to rely upon consent as a basis for profiling will need 
to show that data subjects understand exactly what they are consenting to . . . .”). 
 60. Id. at 21 (“The controller cannot avoid the Article 22 provisions by fabricating human 
involvement [, and] must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful, rather than 
just a token gesture.”). 
 61. Id. (“[I]f someone routinely applies automatically generated profiles to individuals 
without any actual influence on the result, this would still be a decision based solely on 
automated processing.”). 
 62. Id.  
 63. See id. (noting that the controller “should consider all the relevant data” during 
analysis of the decision). 
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how they structure their “human in the loop” of algorithmic decision-making 
to escape Article 22’s prohibition or forego its safeguard requirements.64 
Third, both Recital 71 and the guidelines provide examples of decisions 
with significant effects. Recital 71 provides examples of credit determinations 
and e-recruiting practices.65 The Working Party guidelines explain that “only 
serious impactful effects” will trigger Article 22.66 The guidelines provide both 
a framework for determining what constitutes a significant effect67 and a list of 
examples: decisions that affect financial circumstances or access to health 
services or access to education, or decisions that deny employment or put 
someone “at a serious disadvantage.”68  
The guidelines additionally, and perhaps surprisingly, explain that some 
behavioral advertising will be covered. 69  Particularly intrusive advertising 
targeted at particularly vulnerable data subjects in particularly manipulative 
ways will trigger Article 22.70 Differential pricing—showing people different 
prices based on personal profiles—could also trigger Article 22 if 
“prohibitively high prices effectively bar someone from certain goods or 
services.”71 Thus Article 22’s algorithmic accountability provisions will reach 
 
 64. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 6–7; see also Meg Leta Jones, The Ironies of 
Automation Law: Tying Policy Knots with Fair Automation Practices Principles, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 77 (2015). 
 65. GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 71 
[S]uch as automatic refusal of an online credit application or e-recruiting 
practices without any human intervention . . . in particular to analyse or 
predict aspects concerning the data subject’s performance at work, 
economic situation, health, personal preferences or interests, reliability or 
behaviour, location or movements, where it produces legal effects 
concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her. 
 66. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 21. 
Examples of legal effects in the guidelines largely involve government use of algorithms rather 
than use by private companies but include the cancellation of a contract. The guidelines list as 
examples: entitlement to or denial of a social benefit granted by law; and immigration effects. 
See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING A 
CONTROLLER OR PROCESSOR’S LEAD SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY, 16/EN, WP 244 (Dec. 13, 
2016), at 4 (discussing “substantially affects”).  
 67. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 21 
(“[S]ignificantly affect the circumstances, behaviour or choices of the individuals concerned; 
have a prolonged or permanent impact on the data subject; or at its most extreme, lead to the 
exclusion or discrimination of individuals.”). 
 68. Id. at 22. 
 69. Id. (“Similarly significant effects could also be triggered by the actions of individuals 
other than the one to which the automated decision relates.”). 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. 
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at least some behavioral advertising and some differential pricing tactics. This 
coverage is broader than some scholars predicted.72 
Fourth, the Working Party guidelines somewhat close the trade secrets 
loophole to algorithmic transparency. Several scholars feared that in practice, 
companies could avoid the GDPR’s transparency requirements by citing a 
need for corporate secrecy.73 The guidelines explain, however, that while there 
is “some protection” against having to reveal trade secrets, companies “cannot 
rely on the protection of their trade secrets as an excuse to deny access or 
refuse to provide information . . . .”74 While this does not eliminate the trade 
secrets exception discussed in Recital 63, it does at least urge data protection 
authorities to watch for the use of overly broad trade secrets claims. 
Fifth, the guidelines clarify that both the contractual exception and the 
explicit consent exception to Article 22 are relatively narrow.75 For example, 
online retailers cannot argue that profiling is necessary for an online purchase, 
even where profiling is mentioned in the fine print of the contract. 76 
Automated decision-making might be necessary where human involvement is 
impossible due to the sheer quantity of information processed, but then the 
company must show that there is no other effective and less privacy-intrusive 
way to accomplish the same goal.77 
The guidelines similarly constrain the explicit consent exception and turn 
it into an information-driving tool.78 They explain that individuals must be 
provided enough information about the use and consequences of profiling to 
ensure that any consent “represents an informed choice.”79 The guidelines do 
not provide additional information about “explicit consent,” except to note 
that while explicit consent is not defined in the GDPR, a “high level of 
individual control over personal data is . . . deemed appropriate.”80 
 
 72. See Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not 
Exist, supra note 8, at 92–93, 98; see, e.g., Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, 
at 47–48 (questioning whether race-targeted advertising constitutes a significant effect on an 
individual). 
 73. See Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does not 
Exist, supra note 8, at 85–86; see also Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 53 
(“Article 15(h) has a carve out in the recitals, for the protection of trade secrets and IP.”). 
 74. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 17. 
 75. Id. at 13 (“[N]ecessity should be interpreted narrowly.”). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Id. at 23. 
 78. See id. at 13, 23. 
 79. Id. at 13. 
 80. Id. at 24. See ARTICLE 29 DATA PROTECTION WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON 
CONSENT UNDER REGULATION 2016/679, 17/EN, WP259, (Nov. 28, 2017). 
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Finally, the guidelines address the central question of what is required as 
“appropriate safeguards” to protect individuals from automated decision-
making when one of the exceptions applies.81 Scholars have argued that there 
is no right to an explanation of individual decisions in the GDPR because that 
right is not specifically enumerated in the GDPR’s text.82 That reasoning is 
wrong.83 Recital 71 states that “suitable safeguards . . . should include specific 
information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to 
express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached after 
such assessment and to challenge the decision.”84  
The Working Party guidelines directly quote this language, not once but 
thrice. 85  The guidelines counsel that there is a need for this form of 
transparency because an individual can challenge a particular decision or 
express her view only if she actually understands “how it has been made and 
on what basis.”86 In other words, an individual has a right to explanation of an 
individual decision because that explanation is necessary for her to invoke the 
other rights—e.g., to contest a decision, to express her view—that are 
explicitly enumerated in the text of the GDPR.87 
Beyond the right to explanation, the guidelines explain that the GDPR 
establishes a version of individual algorithmic due process by creating an 
 
 81. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 27. 
 82. Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 50 (“Our view is that these 
certainly seem shaky foundations on which to build a harmoni[z]ed cross-EU right to 
algorithmic explanation.”); Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-
Making Does Not Exist, supra note 8, at 79. 
 83. At this point, the bulk of the literature on the right to explanation appears to agree 
that this reasoning is erroneous. See Brkan, supra note 8, at 16 (“Dismissing the possibility of 
the existence of the right to explanation altogether because recitals are not legally binding is 
too formalistic, in particular in the light of the CoJ’s case law which regularly uses recitals as 
an interpretative aid.”); Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 8, at 255 (“[T]he right to obtain an 
explanation of the decision reached after the assessment should always be exercisable.”); 
Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 16 (“[W]e should not discount the possibility that a right 
of ex post explanation of automated decisions is implicit in the right ‘to contest’ a decision 
pursuant to Art. 22(3).”); Selbst & Powles, supra note 8, at 235 (“Recital 71 is not meaningless, 
and has a clear role in assisting interpretation and co-determining positive law.”), 242 (“We 
believe that the right to explanation should be interpreted functionally, flexibly, and should, at 
a minimum, enable a data subject to exercise his or her rights under the GDPR and human 
rights law.”). 
 84. GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 71 (emphasis added). 
 85. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 19, 
27, 35. 
 86. Id. at 27. 
 87. Both Mendoza & Bygrave and Selbst & Powles suggested precisely this. Mendoza & 
Bygrave, supra note 3, at 16; Selbst & Powles, supra note 8, at 242. 
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opportunity to be heard.88 The guidelines note that safeguards must include 
human intervention by a reviewer with “the appropriate authority and 
capability to change the decision,” and who should have access to “all the 
relevant data.”89 This imposes another form of transparency, albeit internal to 
a company, as technical information flows to the human called on to intervene 
in an algorithmic decision. There is little in the guidelines, however, outlining 
how human intervention and contestation should take place, apart from 
suggesting that companies provide a link to an appeals process, a timeline for 
review, and a named contact person for inquiries.90 This opportunity to be 
heard thus may prove to be more or less meaningful, in practice, and risks 
being, as currently described, reduced to the provision of a contact email. 
The next interpretative move that the guidelines make might not be 
intuitive to a U.S. audience expecting a system entirely focused on individual 
rights. Beyond individual due process, the guidelines interpret “suitable 
safeguards” to also include systemic accountability measures such as auditing 
and ethical review boards.91 These systemic accountability measures have dual 
meaning: They can be understood as bolstering individual rights by ensuring 
that somebody impartial is providing oversight in the name of individuals, or 
as providing necessary accountability over company behavior in a collaborative 
governance (private/public partnership) regime, as companies come up with 
and implement systems for preventing error, bias, and discrimination.92  
In practice, this systemic accountability involves a number of system-wide 
checks. Scholars have read Recital 71’s language to require algorithmic 
auditing. 93  The Working Party Guidelines support this interpretation, 
suggesting that safeguards include quality assurance checks, algorithmic 
auditing, independent third-party auditing, and more.94 Both Recital 71 and the 
guidelines also task companies with preventing discrimination in many forms, 
 
 88. Several U.S. scholars have called for algorithmic due process that closely mirrors 
what is in the GDPR. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 1; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1; Crawford 
& Schultz, supra note 1. 
 89. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 27 
(should assess “all the relevant data”). 
 90. Id. at 32. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 3, at 34. 
 93. Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 8, at 258–59. GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 71 states 
that companies should adopt “technical and organisational measures appropriate to ensure . . . 
that factors which result in inaccuracies in personal data are corrected and the risk of errors is 
minimised.” 
 94. See GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 
32. 
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including on the basis of race, ethnic origin, political opinion, religion.95 The 
guidelines envision ongoing testing and feedback into an algorithmic decision-
making system to prevent errors, inaccuracies, and discrimination on the basis 
of sensitive (“special category”) data.96 
As for whether Member States are bound to create laws incorporating 
these same safeguards—that is, whether the GDPR harmonizes safeguards 
against algorithmic decision-making or leaves space for Member State 
variations—the guidelines are strongly suggestive but not entirely clear. They 
state that “Member . . . State law that authorizes [algorithmic decision-making] 
must also incorporate appropriate safeguarding measures.” 97  In the next 
paragraph, the guidelines state that “[s]uch measures should include as a 
minimum a way for the data subject to obtain human intervention, express 
their point of view, and contest the decision.”98 This suggests that the GDPR 
does harmonize safeguards, even when a Member State creates a new 
exception to the ban on automated decision-making. But as several scholars 
point out, Member State laws have already developed variations on Article 22’s 
safeguards.99 
To return to the larger claim: while the guidelines and Recitals do not 
eliminate all room for interpretation, they largely clarify the GDPR’s 
algorithmic accountability provisions to make them more, not less, rigorous. 
These interpretive documents fully close a number of the loopholes suggested 
by scholars and limit room for others. This causes Article 22 (and 
accompanying notification and access rights) to be broader, stronger, and 
deeper than the preceding EU algorithmic accountability regime. 100  The 
GDPR applies to more activity (is broader), comes with more significant 
 
 95. See id. at 6, 10, 14 (explaining that even in profiling without automated decision-
making, companies should employ “safeguards aimed at ensuring fairness, non-discrimination 
and accuracy in the profiling process”); see also GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 71 (“[P]revent, 
inter alia, discriminatory effects on natural persons on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinion, religion or beliefs, trade union membership, genetic or health status or sexual 
orientation, or processing that results in measures having such an effect.”).  
 96. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 28. 
 97. Id. at 27. 
 98. Id. at 27. 
 99. See Brkan, supra note 8, at 12 (describing German law on insurance); see also Malgieri, 
supra note 41, at 8-9 (describing variations in Member State laws as to suitable safeguards for 
algorithmic decision-making). 
 100. Amy Kapczynski has used similar terms (“broader,” “deeper,” and “more severe”) 
to describe the ratcheting-up of intellectual property law internationally. Amy Kapczynski, The 
Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 821 
(2008). 
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enforcement (is stronger), and adds significant protections (is deeper), 
compared to the Data Protection Directive. 
Article 22 applies to or restricts more activity, and is, therefore, broader 
than Article 15 of the Data Protection Directive. Where the DPD’s provisions 
were limited to automated decision-making connected to individual 
profiling—that is, processing for the purpose of “evaluat[ing] certain personal 
aspects” of the person—Article 22 is not limited to profiling.101 Automated 
decision-making may often “partially overlap with or result from profiling[,]”102 
but the guidelines make clear that Article 22’s scope goes beyond personal 
profiling to other kinds of automated decisions.103 
Article 22 is also broader by virtue of being interpreted to apply to 
decisions involving human rubber-stamping, where several Member States had 
interpreted the Directive’s provisions to apply only to automated decisions 
involving no human at all. 104  Similarly, where some Member States 
implemented the DPD’s provisions as a right to object, the Working Party 
guidelines explain that Article 22 is a prohibition on algorithmic decision-
making.105 It thus applies to all automated decision-making, not just when an 
individual voices an objection. Thus several of the interpretations advanced by 
the Working Party ensure that Article 22 will apply to more activity than the 
DPD did. 
Second, Article 22 is stronger than the Directive’s provisions, meaning that 
it is harder law.106 The GDPR provides both stronger penalties and stronger 
enforcement mechanisms.107  And where Member States could change the 
 
 101. Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 10, 11; GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED 
INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 8 (“Automated decision-making has a 
different scope and may partially overlap with or result from profiling . . . Automated decisions 
can be made with or without profiling; profiling can take place without making automated 
decisions.”). 
 102. See GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 
8. 
 103. See id. (discussing example of imposing speeding fines based on evidence from speed 
cameras). 
 104. See GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 
21; Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist, supra 
note 8, at 94–95. 
 105. See GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 
19. 
 106. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 404 
(2000) (describing a spectrum of “legalization” along the three dimensions of obligation, 
precision, and delegation); Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, 
International Relations and Compliance, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 
552 (Thomas Risse & Beth Simmons eds., 2002). 
 107. See, e.g., Casey et al., supra note 8, at 165–70.  
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wording and in practice the meaning of the DPD through implementation, the 
GDPR, as a regulation, has direct effect within Member States. Thus, the 
wiggle room in Article 22 is lessened (even as the text still contemplates some 
variations by Member States) and the enforcement authority behind it is greatly 
strengthened. 
Finally, Article 22’s protections run deeper than the DPD’s provisions. 
Specifically, the mandatory requirements for companies are more significant 
under the GDPR than they were under the DPD. Under the DPD, if the 
contract exception applied, it was not clear that a company needed to do 
anything else to protect individual rights—it need not necessarily adopt 
safeguards. 108  By contrast, Article 22 requires safeguards—even when an 
exception applies—that, at a minimum, include a right to human intervention, 
a right to object, and a right to express one’s view.109 As discussed above, the 
Working Party guidelines and Recitals clarify that these measures include both 
an individual right to explanation and multiple systemic accountability 
requirements such as audits. 
Article 22 and the accompanying notification and access provisions in 
Articles 13, 14, and 15 thus put in place an algorithmic accountability regime 
that is broader, stronger, and deeper than the largely symbolic regime that 
existed under the DPD. Accompanied by other company duties in the 
GDPR—including establishing data protection officers, using data protection 
impact assessments, and following the principles of data protection by 
design—this regime, if enforced, has the potential to be a sea change in how 
algorithmic decision-making is regulated in the EU.110 
  
 
 108. See Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) art. 15(2)(a) 
[I]s taken in the course of the entering into or performance of a contract, 
provided the request for the entering into or the performance of the 
contract, lodged by the data subject, has been satisfied or that there are 
suitable measures to safeguard his legitimate interests, such as arrangements 
allowing him to put his point of view. 
 109. See GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 22(3). 
 110. See Casey et al., supra note 8, at 173–88 (describing data protection impact 
assessments and data protection by design and by default); see also Edwards & Veale, Slave to 
the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 23, 68–80 (identifying the GDPR’s actual algorithmic 
accountability regime as consisting of DPIAs, PbD, and other individual GDPR rights such 
as the right to erasure). 
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V. THE RIGHT TO EXPLANATION, REVISITED 
Against this backdrop of the GDPR’s strengthened algorithmic 
accountability regime, this Article now returns to the much-debated right to 
explanation. Transparency is a basic principle of the GDPR.111 In fact, it can 
be striking to a U.S. audience just how many of the GDPR’s rights resemble 
open government laws, rather than traditional privacy causes of action.112 This 
is because data protection regimes are grounded in fairness, and transparency 
and fairness are linked ideals; we often use transparency as an element of 
accountability, to establish that systems are fair. 113  But in the right to 
explanation debate, the centrality of transparency to the GDPR has gotten lost. 
Several scholars have, pessimistically, vastly underrepresented what kinds of 
disclosures about algorithmic decision-making are required under the 
GDPR.114 To be fair, these scholars largely wrote before the Working Party 
guidelines were finalized. But now that the final version of the guidelines has 
been released, some explanation of explanation is overdue. 
To understand what is at stake, it is worth briefly summarizing the back-
and-forth over transparency that has taken place in the literature. Scholars on 
both sides of the Atlantic have called for transparency in algorithmic decision-
making, in the form of both notice towards individuals and audits that enable 
expert third-party oversight.115 Some of these calls for transparency have been 
 
 111. See GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 5(1)(a); GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL 
DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 9 (“Transparency of processing is a fundamental 
requirement of the GDPR.”). 
 112. Compare, e.g., GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 12–15, with the U.S. Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552(a) (comparing the GDPR’s rights of transparency, notification, and access to the U.S. 
Privacy Act, which provides individual rights of transparency into public systems of records). 
Compare, e.g., the GDPRs implementation of the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPS), 
with the Prosser privacy torts. For an overview of the FIPS, see GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 5. 
See also GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 39. For a discussion of the Prosser torts, see Neil M. 
Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 
1891–903 (2010). 
 113. Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History (Apr. 10, 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (explaining the principles of transparency and fairness that are at the base of 
worldwide data protection regimes); see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE 
OECD PRIVACY FRAMEWORK 15 (Sept. 23, 1980, revised 2013) (“Openness Principle” and 
“Individual Participation Principle”: “An individual should have the right: a) to obtain from a 
data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data 
relating to him”). 
 114. See, e.g., Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8; Wachter et al., 
Counterfactual, supra note 8; Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making 
Does Not Exist, supra note 8. 
 115. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 1, at 1305; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1; Crawford & 
Schultz, supra note 1; Hildebrandt, supra note 1; Kim, supra note 1; FRANK PASQUALE, THE 
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ambitiously deep and broad, suggesting that both algorithmic source code and 
data sets should be subjected to public scrutiny.116 Others have responded by 
enumerating the harms this level of transparency could cause,117 or by arguing 
that transparency directed at individuals will be relatively useless since 
individuals lack the expertise to do much with it.118 But transparency of some 
kind has a clear place in algorithmic accountability governance, from recent 
calls for algorithmic impact assessments to proposals for whistleblower 
protections, to regularly repeated calls for algorithmic auditing.119 
The GDPR comes closest to creating what Frank Pasquale has called 
“qualified transparency”: a system of targeted revelations of different degrees 
of depth and scope aimed at different recipients.120 Transparency in practice is 
not limited to revelations to the public.121 It includes putting in place internal 
company oversight, oversight by regulators, oversight by third parties, and 
 
BLACK BOX SOCIETY 140–88 (2015) (calling this “qualified transparency”—“limiting 
revelations in order to respect all the interests involved in a given piece of information”). 
 116. Citron supra note 1, at 1308; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 20, 26 (the “logics of 
predictive scoring systems should be open to public inspection”). Citron & Pasquale also note 
that information about the datasets (but not the datasets themselves) could be released to the 
public. Id. at 27 (noting that Zarsky says the public could be informed about datasets without 
social risk); Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1563.  
 117. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 1, at 978 (“[F]ull transparency can do great harm.”); 
Kroll et al., supra note 1, at 639; Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1553–63. 
 118. Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 64, 67 (“Individuals are mostly 
too time-poor, resource-poor, and lacking in the necessary expertise to meaningfully make use 
of these individual rights.”); Kroll et al., supra note 1, at 638 (“The source code of computer 
systems is illegible to nonexperts.”). 
 119. See, e.g., Desai & Kroll, supra note 1 (calling for whistleblower protections); A. Michael 
Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from Environmental Impact 
Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1713 (2015) (calling for “requirements for those 
conducting mass surveillance in and through public spaces to disclose their plans publicly via 
an updated form of environmental impact statement”); Price, supra note 1, at 421 (arguing that 
the FDA should pursue a “more adaptive regulatory approach with requirements that 
developers disclose information underlying their algorithms”); Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate 
Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017) (describing the potential benefits of 
“algorithmic impact statements [requiring] police departments to evaluate the efficacy and 
potential discriminatory effects of all available choices for predictive policing technologies”); 
David Wright & Charles D. Raab, Constructing a Surveillance Impact Assessment, 28 COMPUTER L. 
& SECURITY REV. 613 (2012) (describing “surveillance impact assessment (SIA), a 
methodology for identifying, assessing and resolving risks . . . posed by the development of 
surveillance systems”). 
 120. PASQUALE, supra note 115, at 142. 
 121. See Zarksy, supra note 1, at 1532 (“Intuitively, transparency is linked to merely one 
meaning—that the relevant information is disseminated broadly to (1) the general public” but 
“[f]ully understanding this concept, however, calls for distinguishing among the recipients of the 
information transparency policy provides.”). But see Kroll et al., supra note 1, which appears to 
define transparency only as disclosure to the public.  
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communications to affected individuals. Each of these revelations may be of a 
different depth or kind; an oversight board might get access to the source code, 
while an individual instead might get clearly communicated summaries that she 
can understand. 
To summarize the right to explanation and accompanying transparency 
measures, as some have, as a “transparency fallacy”—palliative measures 
requiring mere icons or simplistic explanations—is to both misrepresent their 
actual substance and mischaracterize the GDPR’s overall transparency 
regime.122 The GDPR’s individual transparency provisions are deeper than 
some have suggested. And the overall accountability regime that the GDPR 
puts in place establishes multiple layers of transparency, some of which go very 
deep indeed. This Part starts with individual transparency rights, before turning 
to the systemic approach to algorithmic accountability that the GDPR puts in 
place. 
Individuals have a “right to be informed” about algorithmic decision-
making.123 That right is housed both in the “meaningful information about the 
logic involved” provisions of Articles 13 and 14 and in Article 22(3)’s suitable 
safeguards provision.124 It is true that the guidelines state that individuals need 
not be provided with source code or complex mathematical explanations, 
under either Article 22 or the accompanying notification and access 
provisions.125 But that is because those individual transparency provisions are 
meant to serve the purpose of providing expert oversight. 
The “who” and “why” of transparency in the GDPR dictates the what, 
when, and how. Individual transparency provisions, as the guidelines make 
clear, are intended to empower individuals to invoke their other rights under 
the GDPR.126 Therefore, while individuals need not be provided with source 
code, they should be given far more than a one-sentence overview of how an 
algorithmic decision-making system works. They need to be given enough 
information to be able to understand what they are agreeing to (if a company 
 
 122. Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 43; Wachter et. al, 
Counterfactual, supra note 8, at 865–66, 887. 
 123. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 20. 
 124. Id. at 20, 25 (“Providing this information will also help controllers ensure they are 
meeting some of the required safeguards referred to in Article 22(3) and Recital 71.”). 
 125. Id. at 25 (“[N]ot necessarily a complex explanation of the algorithms used or 
disclosure of the full algorithm.”), 31 (“Instead of providing a complex mathematical 
explanation about how algorithms or machine-learning work, the controller should consider 
using clear and comprehensive ways to deliver the information to the data subject.”). 
 126. Id. at 27 (“The controller should provide the data subject with general information 
. . . which is also useful for him or her to challenge the decision . . . . The data subject will only 
be able to challenge a decision or express their view if they fully understand how it has been 
made and on what basis.”). 
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is relying on the explicit consent exception);127 to contest a decision;128 and to 
find and correct erroneous information, including inferences.129  
Scholars have (in this Article’s view, disingenuously) suggested that the 
GDPR’s transparency requirements in Article 12—requirements that 
companies make an effort to communicate information in a way 
understandable to individuals— restrict the depth and quality of information 
a company must reveal.130 Article 12 demands that companies communicate 
clearly, to ensure that individuals can in fact act on the information they 
receive. It aims to prevent companies from flooding individuals with useless 
or unnecessarily complicated or time-wasting information, abusing notice 
requirements to create obscurity through information floods. 131  In other 
words, Article 12 requires that companies make their communications to 
individuals comprehensible. It does not reduce the GDPR’s substantial 
disclosure requirements to meaninglessly high-level or simplistic information 
 
 127. Id. at 13 (“Controllers seeking to rely upon consent as a basis for profiling will need 
to show that data subjects understand exactly what they are consenting to.”).  
 128. Id. at 27. 
 129. Id. at 17–18 (“Individuals may wish to challenge the accuracy of the data used and 
any grouping or category that has been applied to them. This rights to rectification and erasure 
apply to both the ‘input personal data’ (the personal data used to create a profile), and the 
‘output data’ (the profile itself or ‘score’ assigned to the person).”), 31 (“Controllers providing 
data subjects with access to their profile in connection with their Article 15 rights should allow 
them the opportunity to update or amend any inaccuracies in the data or profile.”). 
 130. See Wachter et. al, Counterfactual, supra note 8, at 865 (“Detailed information appears 
to not be necessary as Art. 12(7) states that the required information can be provided along 
with standardi[z]ed icons . . . proposed icons reveal the initial expectations of regulators for 
simple, easily understood information.”), 866 (“[E]ach provision suggests that information 
disclosures need to be tailored to their audience, with envisioned audiences including children 
and uneducated laypeople.”), 887 (illustrating simplistic transparency infographics that were 
ultimately not adopted by the European Parliament, and stating that these “reveal the level of 
complexity expected by EU legislators” in an explanation to a data subject and that “[t]he 
reliance on generic icons suggests that individual-level, contextualised information is not 
required”). 
 131. See Ananny & Crawford, supra note 1, at 979 (“[S]trategic opacity—in which actors 
‘bound by transparency regulations’ purposefully make so much information ‘visible that 
unimportant pieces of information will take so much time and effort to sift through that 
receivers will be distracted from the central information the actor wishes to conceal.’ ”); 
Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1508 (“The process of merely flooding the public with facts and figures 
does not effectively promote transparency. It might even backfire.”); see also Wendy E. Wagner, 
Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1324–25 (2010); 
GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 31 (“Instead 
of providing a complex mathematical explanation . . . the controller should consider using 
clear and comprehensive ways to deliver the information to the data subject.”). 
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or infographics. Companies can be required to communicate in-depth 
information at the same time that they are required to communicate it clearly.132 
Communication to individuals about algorithmic decision-making must 
thus be simultaneously understandable (or “legible”), 133  meaningful, and 
actionable. It must be understandable to individuals, rather than delivered in 
complex jargon or as an information flood.134 However, it must also convey 
considerable depth; the guidelines note that “[c]omplexity is no excuse for 
failing to provide information.”135 And it must provide enough information 
that an individual can act on it—to contest a decision, or to correct 
inaccuracies, or to request erasure.136  
Thus, there is a clear relationship between the other individual rights the 
GDPR establishes—contestation, correction, and erasure—and the kind of 
individualized transparency it requires. This suggests something interesting 
about transparency: the substance of other underlying legal rights often 
determines transparency’s substance.137 If one has a right of correction, one 
needs to see errors. If one has a right against discrimination, one needs to see 
what factors are used in a decision. Otherwise, information asymmetries 
render underlying rights effectively void. 
The guidelines list examples of what kinds of information should be 
provided to individuals and how it should be provided. Individuals should be 
told both the categories of data used in an algorithmic decision-making process 
and an explanation of why these categories are considered relevant. 138 
 
 132. See, e.g., RANDALL MUNROE, THING EXPLAINER: COMPLICATED STUFF IN SIMPLE 
WORDS (2015) (Munroe “used line drawings and only the thousand (or, rather, “ten hundred”) 
most common words to provide simple explanations for some of the most interesting stuff 
there is”). Thanks to Matthew R. Cushing for the pointer. 
 133. Malgieri & Comandé, supra note 1, at 245 (introducing the concept of legibility to 
this debate: “legibility is concerned with making data and analytics algorithms both transparent 
and comprehensible”) (citing Richard Mortier, et al., Human Data Interaction: The Human Face of 
the Data-Driven Society, MIT TECH. REV. (2014); see Zarsky, supra note 1, at 1520 (discussing the 
related concept of interpretability). 
 134. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 31 
(“[C]lear and comprehensive”). 
 135. Id. at 25, n.40. 
 136. See id. at 17, 27, 31; see also Mendoza & Bygrave, supra note 3, at 16 (explaining that 
the possibility of a “right of ex post explanation of automated decision is implicit in the right 
‘to consent’ a decision”); Selbst & Powles, supra note 8, at 242 (explaining that enhancing data 
subject rights to include the right to “contest a decision” is reinforced by “GDPR’s emphasis 
on meaningful transparency . . . in a way that is useful, intelligible, and actionable to the data 
subject”). 
 137. Selbst & Barocas, Intuitive Appeal, supra note 3, at 1120–21. 
 138. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 31 
(explaining good practice recommendations for data controllers). 
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Moreover, they should be told the “factors taken into account for the decision-
making process, and . . . their respective ‘weight’ on an aggregate level . . . .”139 
They should be told how a profile used in algorithmic decision-making is built, 
“including any statistics used in the analysis[,]”140 and the sources of the data 
in the profile.141 Lastly, companies should provide individuals an explanation 
of why a profile is relevant to the decision-making process and how it is used 
for a decision.142  
The GDPR’s individualized system of algorithmic transparency thus 
requires far more than a counterfactual explanation (e.g., “if you were not 25, 
you would have gotten this job”).143 The guidelines further note, in several 
places, that companies should use technological design to create more effective 
notice mechanisms, such as through “visuali[z]ation and interactive 
techniques.”144 Not only is it a company’s duty to communicate a particular 
depth of information, but a company must also pay attention to using effective 
design choices to ensure that information is both noticed and understood. 
This does not mean that the individual right to explanation and the 
accompanying transparency rights in the GDPR give individuals a right to all 
information about an algorithm. Nor does it mean to suggest that the 
conversation about what information must be released to individuals ends 
here. It is clear from the guidelines that this conversation will be ongoing. 
There is still room to read in, for example, a best practice of releasing 
performance metrics, which the guidelines do not suggest.145 Two scholars 
have proposed a number of suggestions of the kind of information that would 
be useful—including both information about the model (the family of model, 
training parameters, summary input data, human-understandable averages of 
how inputs become outputs, how the model was tested, trained, or screened) 
and information about the individual decision (counterfactuals, which cases 
 
 139. Id. at 27 (“[W]hich is also useful for him or her to challenge the decision.”). 
 140. Id. at 31. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. But see Wachter et. al, Counterfactual, supra note 8. 
 144. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 31 
(“Controllers may want to consider implementing a mechanism for data subjects to check their 
profile, including details of the information and sources used to develop it.”). Id. at 32 
(“Controllers could consider introducing online preference management tools such as a 
privacy dashboard.”). Hildebrandt, supra note 1, at 53 (calling for “TETs”: transparency-
enhancing tools); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 1, at 29 (suggesting interactive modeling). 
 145. Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 55; Malgieri & Comandé, supra 
note 8, at 259. 
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are most similar to the individual’s, what characteristics cause individuals to 
receive similar treatment, how confident the system is of a specific outcome).146 
But the GDPR’s individual algorithmic transparency rights, accompanied 
by other GDPR transparency rights, go a long way towards establishing what 
U.S. scholars have called for—including revealing the sources of data, 
inferences about an individual, and even some math. 147  Throughout, the 
emphasis is on individual understanding of information of a meaningful depth, 
so that an individual subject of algorithmic decision-making can invoke her 
rights. 
Other forms of systemic transparency that go substantially deeper 
accompany this individualized transparency regime. Individuals might not 
have access to source code or datasets, but other parties do. The GDPR’s 
regime of systemic transparency is established through Article 22’s safeguards 
provision and the Working Party interpretation of it, and through more general 
GDPR provisions such as the requirement of impact assessments.148 This 
systemic transparency regime includes the requirement of data protection 
impact assessments for automated processing, the general information-forcing 
and oversight powers granted to regulatory authorities. 
There are a number of ways that systematic transparency can be 
implemented. First, regulators can use significant information-forcing 
capabilities under the GDPR to get access to information about algorithms.149 
The GDPR also envisions general data protection audits conducted by 
government authorities.150  
Second, most companies deploying algorithmic decision-making must set 
up internal accountability and disclosure regimes. They must perform a data 
protection impact assessment,151 and provide information to an internal but 
 
 146. Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 8, at 55–56, 58. 
 147. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 31 
(mentioning “any statistics used in the analysis”). 
 148. Id. at 28, 32 (discussing safeguards under art. 22). GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 35, art. 
58. 
 149. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 58(1)(e) (authorizing the authority to carry out data 
protection audits, and “obtain, from the controller and the processor, access to all personal 
data and to all information necessary for the performance of its tasks”). 
 150. See id. at art. 58(1)(b). 
 151. Id. at art. 35(3)(a) (requiring a data protection impact assessment “in a systematic and 
extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural persons which is based on 
automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based that produce legal 
effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural person”); 
GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 29–30 
(explaining that this requirement “will apply in the case of decision-making including profiling 
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independent data protection officer who has, at least on paper, deep 
information-forcing abilities.152 Companies that fall under Article 22 must also 
give human reviewers deeper transparency onto “all the relevant data” as part 
of the right to human intervention.153 
Third, the guidelines suggest that companies performing decision-making 
with a “high impact on individuals” should use independent third-party 
auditing and provide that auditor with “all necessary information about how 
the algorithm or machine learning system works.”154  Hence, the GDPR’s 
approach to systemic accountability establishes a second aspect of Pasquale’s 
“qualified transparency”: deeper information flows, including source code, 
both within companies and to regulatory authorities and third-parties. It is true 
that this information does not get released to the public. But it is myopic to 
focus only on the individual version of transparency and decry its shallowness, 
rather than seeing its place and purpose in a system of required information 
flows. 
The purpose of each transparency measure affects not just the depth of 
information revealed but also the timing of transparency.155 Discrete events in 
the GDPR trigger individual transparency—when, for example, data is 
collected,156 a decision is made,157 an individual’s consent is obtained,158 or an 
individual requests information.159 This connects individualized transparency 
to the rights of an individual, but limits the efficacy of individualized 
transparency at creating oversight over the construction of an algorithm, or its 
ongoing performance. In particular, individual transparency rights largely 
occur after the fact of algorithmic development, when it is far more difficult 
(if not impossible) to impose accountability or corrections on a system.160 By 
 
with legal or similarly significant effects that is not wholly automated, as well as solely 
automated decision-making defined in Article 22(1)”). 
 152. Id. at art. 38(2) (“The controller and processor shall support the data protection 
officer in performing the tasks . . . by providing . . . access to personal data and processing 
operations . . . .”); GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 
9, at 29–30.  
 153. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 27 
(assess “all the relevant data”). 
 154. Id. at 32. 
 155. Ananny & Crawford, supra note 1, at 982 (discussing the “temporal dimension of 
transparency”). 
 156. See GDPR, supra note 6, at arts. 13, 14. 
 157. See id. at art. 22; GDPR, supra note 6, Recital 71. 
 158. GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 9, at 12–
13. 
 159. GDPR, supra note 6, at art. 15 
 160. Kroll et al., supra note 1 at 659–60, 662; Desai & Kroll, supra note 1 at 39–42. 
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contrast, the GDPR’s systemic accountability measures are envisioned as 
ongoing, continuous,161 and being implemented early on in an algorithm’s 
development. This creates, in theory at least, internal, expert/third-party, and 
regulatory oversight over the development of an algorithm from its inception, 
better serving the purposes of correcting error, inaccuracy, and bias in a 
changing system over time. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The GDPR sets up a system of “qualified transparency” over algorithmic 
decision-making that gives individuals one kind of information, and experts 
and regulators another. This multi-pronged approach to transparency should 
not be dismissed as lightly as some have done. There is an individual right to 
explanation. It is deeper than counterfactuals or a shallow and broad systemic 
overview, and it is coupled with other transparency measures that go towards 
providing both third-party and regulatory oversight over algorithmic decision-
making. These transparency provisions are just one way in which the GDPR’s 
system of algorithmic accountability is potentially broader, deeper, and 
stronger than the previous EU regime.  
It is one thing to put these requirements on paper and quite another to 
have them operate in practice. The system of algorithmic accountability that 
the GDPR and its accompanying interpretative documents envision faces 
significant hurdles in implementation: high costs to both companies and 
regulators, limited individual access to justice, and limited technical capacity of 
both individuals and regulators. As I note elsewhere, there are other ways in 
which the GDPR may fail.162 Its heavy reliance on collaborative governance in 
the absence of significant public or third-party oversight could lead to capture 
or underrepresentation of individual rights.163 
But for companies with a footprint in the EU, it is important to note that 
the GDPR does govern algorithmic decision-making, and many of the 
 
 161. See, e.g., GUIDELINES ON AUTOMATED INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING, supra note 
9, at 28  
Controllers should introduce appropriate procedures and measures to 
prevent errors, inaccuracies or discrimination on the basis of special 
category data. These measures should be used on a cyclical basis; not only 
at the design stage, but also continuously, as the profiling is applied to 
individuals. The outcome of such testing should feed back into the system 
design. 
See, e.g., Ananny & Crawford, supra note 1, at 976. 
 162. See Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 3, at 67–68. 
 163. See, e.g., CHRISTINA ANGELOPOULOS ET AL., STUDY OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
LIMITATIONS FOR ONLINE ENFORCEMENT THROUGH SELF-REGULATION (2016) (discussing 
the problems raised by delegating individual rights protection to companies). 
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potential loopholes in that system have been limited or closed. Companies face 
a decision of whether to put humans meaningfully back in the loop of 
algorithmic decision-making and thus escape Article 22. Otherwise, they must 
put in place a significant set of safeguards, including both individual rights and 
ongoing internal and third-party accountability measures. 
